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I. INTRODUCTION
While Israel self-defines itself as “a Jewish and democratic State,”1 the
Israeli laws that pertain to the most intimate of choices—the choice of a life
partner—are ancient religious laws and not laws that were enacted in a
democratic process.2 The only way to get married in Israel is in a religious
ceremony according to one’s religion.3 The determination of a person’s
religion, as will be discussed below, is also under the sole jurisdiction of
* Associate Professor, The Haim Striks School of Law, The College of Management
Academic Studies, Rishon LeZion, Israel.
1. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 1a, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150, as amended
by SH No. 1454 p. 90 (Isr.), translation available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/
basic3_eng.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
2. Isaac S. Shiloh, Marriage and Divorce in Israel, 5 ISR. L. REV. 479, 479 (1970)
(distinguishing Israel’s “ramified system of religious tribunals for the administration [of marriage]”
from the secular marriage laws of European legal systems).
3. Id. (“[N]early all [must] achieve either marital bliss or, if necessary, the happiness resulting
from the dissolution of a miserable marriage in the manner sanctioned by the authorities of their own
religious denomination.”).

1091

[Vol. 41: 1091, 2014]

A Jewish and Democratic State
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

religious tribunals according to religious law.4
This regime creates numerous problems from a secular point of view,
three of which will be discussed in this Essay. First, religious affiliation is
not a matter of self-definition, nor is it a matter of determination by secular
state law. It is determined according to ancient religious laws and the
secular state therefore has no way of altering or adapting them to our time.
Second, Israelis have apparently a very narrow right to freedom from
religion.5 Secular Israelis, whether Jews, Muslims, or Christians, who do not
wish to marry in a religious ceremony or to have a religious divorce have no
civil procedure or ceremony available in Israel.6 They must travel abroad
and get married in a country that allows non-citizens to get married on its
territory.7 Third, Israeli citizens who wish to get married in Israel are
limited to choose only partners from their own religion, since most religions
regard interfaith marriages as void.8
After briefly introducing the roots of the religious monopoly over
personal status issues in Israel, this Essay will discuss these three limitations
on the “democratic” part in Israel’s self-definition and the impact they have
on Israeli secularism.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE RELIGIOUS MONOPOLY OVER PERSONAL STATUS
ISSUES IN ISRAEL
The existing religious monopoly in Israel over personal status issues
originated during the Ottoman Empire’s rule over Palestine.9 During the
4. See generally Pinhas Shifman, Religious Affiliation in Israeli Interreligious Law, 15 ISR. L.
REV. 1 (1980).
5. See generally Zvi Triger, Freedom from Religion in Israel: Civil Marriages and
Cohabitation of Jews Enter the Rabbinical Courts, 27 ISR. STUD. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter Triger,
Freedom from Religion in Israel].
6. Id. at 5.
7. Id.
8 . See id. at 9 (“Judaism, Islam, and other religions impose restrictions on marriage between
people of different faiths and, in many cases, even regard this kind of marriage as void.”). A narrow
exception to this principle exists in the case of Islam, which recognizes the marriage of a Muslim
man with a non-Muslim woman under certain circumstances (but not vice versa). See, e.g., Alex B.
Leeman, Note, Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal Theory Behind the
Traditional and Reformist Positions, 84 IND. L.J. 743, 755–59 (2009).
9. See ABIGAIL JACOBSON, FROM EMPIRE TO EMPIRE: JERUSALEM BETWEEN OTTOMAN AND
BRITISH RULE 9–10 (2011).

1092

[Vol. 41: 1091, 2014]

A Jewish and Democratic State
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

empire’s four-century rule, the Ottomans gave the various religious
communities throughout the empire almost full autonomy concerning family
issues.10 Family matters were dealt with within the communities’ and tribes’
religious tribunals according to their own religious laws.11 When the British
occupied Palestine in 1917, they left the autonomous family law systems in
place.12 The British Mandate Government that ruled in Palestine between
July 24, 1922 and May 15, 194813 continued the Ottoman policy with regard
to family issues without any significant changes.14
When the State of Israel was founded, the Israeli legislature preserved
this system.15 While some matters of personal status were removed from the
religious tribunals’ jurisdiction and became subject to secular law only,16
10. See id.
11. See M. Chigier, The Rabbinical Courts in the State of Israel, 2 ISR. L. REV. 147, 147–48
(1967). This policy was considered at the time to be highly progressive. Louisa Culleton, Armenian
Rights in the Ottoman Empire, 2004 UCL JURISPRUDENCE REV. 144, 155 (2004) (noting the liberal
quality of the Ottoman millet system and explaining that “it was in fact a very progressive system for
its time”). Today, some might view this policy as an expression of a multi-cultural sensitivity, yet
the Ottomans most likely implemented it based on their own political reasons rather than sensitivity
to the other. But cf. id. (“The objective of the millet system was . . . simply to protect the nonMuslim minorities from the Muslim-majority. . . . It was actually to protect individuals as members
of a national community against possible illiberal religious laws of a religion that was not theirs.”).
Interestingly, many colonial regimes tend to adopt such policies. See Carmel Shalev, Freedom of
Marriage and Cohabitation (Cohabitation and Marriage Outside the Religious Law) in WOMEN’S
STATUS IN ISRAELI LAW AND SOCIETY 459, 464 (Frances Raday, Carmel Shalev and Michal LibanKooby eds., 1995) (Hebrew).
12. See, e.g., Daphne Tsimhoni, The Status of the Arab Christians Under the British Mandate in
Palestine, 20 MIDDLE E. STUD. 166, 166–69 (1984) (detailing the preservation of the millet system
under the British Mandate).
13. S. Shepard Jones, The Status of Jerusalem: Some National and International Aspects, 33
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 176 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Tsimhoni, supra note 12, at 166–69. From its occupation by Britain in 1917 until
the establishment of the British Mandate by the League of Nations, Palestine was governed by a
British military administration. See generally Yair Wallach, Creating a Country Through Currency
and Stamps: State Symbols and Nation-Building in British-Ruled Palestine, 17 NATIONS &
NATIONALISM 129 (2011). All in all, the British rule in Palestine lasted thirty-one years.
15. Law and Administration Ordinance, No.1 of 5708-1948, 1 LSI 7 (1948) (Isr.). “The
Ordinance was enacted on 10th Iyar, 5708 (May 19, 1948), and published in the Official Gazette, No.
2 of the 12th Iyar, 5708 (May 21, 1948).” Triger, Freedom from Religion in Israel, supra note 5, at
15 n.3.
16 . See Ariel Rosen-Zvi, Family and Inheritance Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
ISRAEL 75, 76-77 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar eds., 1995). Some examples of this
include matters of communal property, successions, wills and legacies, and the administration of
property belonging to absent people. Id.
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matters of marriage and divorce remained subject to religious laws.17 As the
late Israeli family law scholar Ariel Rosen-Zvi put it, “[i]n the area of family
law, Israel’s legal system is characterized by a laminated structure of
religious laws, territorial legislation unique to family law, judge-made law
grafted onto religious laws and general, civil and criminal laws.”18
Perhaps one the most peculiar implications of this hybrid system is the
criminal law’s response to polygamy. While polygamy is prohibited by
law,19 there is a religious exemption from criminal liability for bigamous
men who marry an additional wife without divorcing the first one pursuant
to a religious tribunal’s permission.20
Another consequence of the religious monopoly over marriage and
divorce is related to women’s status. All major religions are patriarchal,
and, therefore, all religious family laws discriminate against women.21
While the Declaration of Independence promises gender equality,22 the
Israeli legislature has made sure that the realms governed by religious law
will remain exempt from this requirement, as explained below.23
The constitutional regime in Israel is comprised of the Declaration of
17. Id. at 75.
18. Id.
19. Josh Goodman, Divine Judgment: Judicial Review of Religious Legal Systems in India and
Israel, 32 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 477, 514 (2009).
20 . See, e.g., Pascale Fournier & Pascal McDougall, False Jurisdictions? A Revisionist Take on
Customary (Religious) Law in Germany, 48 TEX. INL’L L.J. 435, 458–59 (2013). Both Jewish law
and Islamic law allow men to marry more than one wife, but not vice versa. See Ruth Lapidoth,
Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 441, 448–49 (1998). See
generally P. Shifman, English Law of Bigamy in a Multi-Confessional Society: The Israel
Experience, 26 AM. J. COMP. L. 79 (1977). Jewish men receive such permissions when their wives
refuse to divorce them or unable to accept a divorce due to mental incapacity. Karin Carmit Yefet,
Unchaining the Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women’s Marital
Freedom, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 441, 445–49 (2009). The rabbinical court began collecting data
on approvals of bigamous marriages for Jewish men in 2004, and between 2004 and 2007 the
rabbinical court issued forty-two such approvals. See WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN ISRAEL:
STATISTICAL BI-ANNUAL REPORT 95 (Ruth Halperin-Kaddari and Inbal Karo eds., 2009) (Hebrew).
21. See generally Gila Stopler, Article, The Free Exercise of Discrimination: Religious Liberty,
Civic Community and Women’s Equality, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 459 (2004).
22. THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1948), available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20establishment%2
0of%20state%20of%20israel.aspx.
23. To be sure, secularism in and of itself is not necessarily committed to gender equality. See
generally Seval Yildirim, Expanding Secularism’s Scope: An Indian Case Study, 52 AM. J. COMP. L.
901 (2004).
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Independence and a series of Basic Laws that have been enacted gradually
over the years.24 The Basic Laws that have been enacted enjoy a superior
constitutional status, and the Supreme Court has used them—in a series of
controversial decisions—as a tool for judicial review.25 There are eleven
Basic Laws.26 Two of them, namely Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, secure certain human rights and
civil liberties; however, neither contains the word “equality,” and neither
applies to previously enacted laws.27 They lack retroactive power in part
because of the religious monopoly in the area of personal status.28 Religious
laws of most religions are notoriously discriminatory, first and foremost
against women.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has read equality into the value of human
dignity protected by the first Basic Law,29 but the constitutional
infrastructure that the Court has built through its judgments is significantly
fragile, as it does not rest on explicit legislative language, but rather on
interpretation.30 The next section explores the question of religious
affiliation, which is crucial for determining to which religion an Israeli
citizen “belongs,” and thus, which religious tribunal has jurisdiction over his
or her personal status issues.

24. See Yousef T. Jabareen, Constitution Building and Equality in Deeply-Divided Societies:
The Case of the Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 345, 352–53 (2008).
25. See id. at 353 (describing a specific Israeli Supreme Court case in an effort to illustrate the
limited “constitutional power of judicial review . . . under the Basic Law system”).
26. See Knesset, The Existing Basic Laws: Full Texts, http://www.knesset.gov.il/
description/eng/eng_mimshal_yesod1.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
27. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150, as amended by SH
No. 1454 p. 90 (Isr.), translation available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/
eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014); Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH
No. 1454 p. 90, translation available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
28. See generally Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in Israel: The
Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U PA. J. CONST. L. 851 (2001) (discussing the issue of retroactive
application of Israel’s Basic Laws).
29. See Judith Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty—A Chronicle of Power Battles, 1
MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 323, 345–61 (1992) (Hebrew). Indeed, the principle of equality was
deliberately omitted from the Basic Laws. Id. at 346.
30. See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State in Israel: The Case for Reevaluation and Constitutional
Entrenchment, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 617, 643–48 (1999).
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III. RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF ISRAELIS
The question of religious affiliation, known also in Israeli politics as the
“Who is a Jew?” debate,31 is central to the maintenance of segregation
between religious and ethnic communities in the country. This segregation,
facilitated by the religious marriage regime, was viewed in the early 1950s
by the Knesset—the Israeli parliament—as necessary in the wake of the
Holocaust and the murder of 6 million Jews by the Nazis and their allies.32 It
was considered a means to revive the Jewish people by avoiding assimilation
through marriage.33 It also stemmed from the view that being a Jew is not
only a matter of religion, but also a matter of ethnic identity as well as of
national identity.34
Interestingly, however, the definition of a Jew had not been set on
religious criteria during Israel’s first two decades . While it was highly
debated, it was still open to a secular interpretation. In the mid-1950s, David
Ben-Gurion, Israel’s founder and first Prime Minister, declared that being a
Jew is a matter of personal choice and self-definition, and it does not require
any type of official religious conversion.35 The Minister of the Interior,
Israel Bar-Yehuda, instructed in 1958 that “a person who declares in good
faith that he is a Jew, shall be registered as a Jew, and shall not be required
to provide any further evidence [for his claim].”36
The resulting governmental crisis led to a gradual narrowing of BenGurion’s and Bar-Yehuda’s definition.37 Following two high-profile
Supreme Court cases that basically followed the self-definition test,38 the

31. See Who is a Jew? The Great Debate, JEWISH CHRON. ONLINE (Sep. 30, 2009),
http://www.thejc.com/judaism/judaism-features/20463/who-a-jew-the-great-debate.
32. Zvi H. Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation: Foreign Men, “Our” Women, and the Law,
30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 479, 482 (2009) [hereinafter Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation].
33. Id. at 521–22.
34. See Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185, 193–94 (1987)
(discussing the secular definition of a Jew).
35 . Zvi Zameret, Judaism in Israel: Ben-Gurion’s Private Beliefs and Public Policy, 4 ISRAEL
STUD. 64, 74 (1999).
36 . DAPHNE BARAK EREZ, MILESTONE JUDGMENTS OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT 49 (2003)
(Hebrew).
37. See, e.g., Zameret, supra note 35, at 73–74.
38 . HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16 P.D. 2428 [1962] (Isr.); HCJ 58/68 Shalit
v. Minister of the Interior, 23(2) P.D. 477 [1970] (Isr.); see also Englard supra note 34, at 193–96
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religious parties in the coalition demanded in the late 1960s a legal reform in
the definition of a Jew that would conform to the Jewish Orthodox
interpretation of Jewish law, which meant that only a person born to a
Jewish mother or who converted to Judaism can be recognized as a Jew.39
Religious affiliation thus became a matter of an objective fact (either birth or
proper conversion), and no longer of self-definition.
One of the problems with the religious definition of one’s religion is that
it creates such absurdities as people with dual religions (those born to a
Jewish mother and a Muslim father, since in Islam the religious affiliation
rule is paternal), or people with no religion at all (for example, those born to
a Muslim mother and a Jewish father). As I mentioned above, in order to
know how and with whom one can get married in Israel, we have to first
determine his or her religion. The lack of a civil definition creates a problem
of circularity: which religious law should be applied for the purpose of
determining a person’s religion when in doubt? Doesn’t the choice of law in
this case already determine the result? The absence of civil marriage in
Israeli law makes these questions even more burning because they have
serious implications for a person’s right to choose a partner.
IV. THE LACK OF CIVIL MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL AND THE DE FACTO
PROHIBITION ON INTERFAITH MARRIAGE IN ISRAEL
There is no civil marriage in Israel.40 People who either wish to marry a
person of a different religion or wish to exercise their freedom from religion
and not marry in a religious ceremony cannot get married in Israel.41 While
Israel’s secular laws do not prohibit interfaith marriage directly, there is an
indirect prohibition on such marriages.42 However, following the Supreme

(discussing the two cases and the subsequent political pressure to create a legislative definition of a
Jew that conforms to Jewish law).
39 . See Ofrit Liviatan, Judicial Activism and Religion-Based Tensions in India and Israel, 26
ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L., 583, 605 (2009); see also Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 57301970, 24 LSI 28, §4.B (1969–1970) (Isr.) (“For the purposes of this Law, ‘Jew’ means a person who
was born of a Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of
another religion.”).
40 . See Zvi Triger, Freedom from Religion in Israel, supra note 5, at 5.
41. See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text.
42 .

Triger, The Gendered Racial Formation, supra note 32, at 481.
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Court’s ruling in the landmark 1963 Funk-Schlesinger case, Israeli
authorities must register as married couples who marry abroad, regardless of
the religion of the spouses.43 This opened up the door for interfaith couples
to get married, as well as for Jewish couples who did not want to get married
in a religious ceremony or could not do so.44 However, this is a costly
option,45 and the additional economic and bureaucratic requirements that are
imposed on such couples are, from a liberal point of view, clearly
discriminatory.
Since virtually all countries that allow marriage tourism do not allow
divorce tourism when both spouses are non-citizens or non-residents,46
Israeli couples who got married abroad and wish to get a divorce need a
local solution. After decades of vague and sometimes conflicting court
rulings, the Supreme Court finally ruled in 2006 that the rabbinical court
system has jurisdiction over the divorce of Jewish couples who marry civilly
abroad.47 The Court’s decision was based on Jewish law principles and was
pre-approved by a rabbinical court panel.48 However, because of the
ongoing power struggles between the secular courts and the rabbinical court,
43 .

HCJ 143/62 Funk-Schlesinger v. Minister of Interior, 17(1) PD 225 [1963] (Isr.).

44 . See id. Under certain circumstances, Jewish law also prohibits marriages between Jews.
For example, a man who belongs to the class of priests (Cohanim) cannot marry a divorced woman,
and a married woman who has an affair with another man cannot marry him if she divorces her
husband. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Personal Law Systems and Religious Conflict: A
Comparison of India and Israel, in RELIGION AND PERSONAL LAW IN SECULAR INDIA: A CALL TO
JUDGMENT 282 (Gerald James Larson ed., 2001). These are ancient laws that are enforced in
modern Israel as a result of the religious monopoly over marriage and divorce. See id. (“Jews
wishing to marry in Israel must seek the approval of the rabbinical courts that apply [traditional]
Jewish religious law, or Halachah. Some observers note that since 1947, the rabbinical courts have
interpreted the Halachah more strictly than before the creation of the state.”). Secular modern Jews
who do not observe the religious commandments do not see these ancient laws as relevant to their
lives. See id. at 281 (“[S]ecularists and non-Orthodox Jews [in Israel] resent being subject to any
Orthodox rabbinical control, particularly in matters of vital concern such as marriage and divorce.”).
Nevertheless, they are prohibited from getting married in Israel; therefore, civil marriage abroad
provides them with a good solution. Id. at 282.
45. See id. (noting the significant expense to some Israeli couples of having to travel outside of
Israel to get married).
46 . For a general overview of the phenomena of marriage tourism and divorce shopping see
Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, From Rights and Obligations to Contested Rights and Obligations:
Individualization, Globalization , and Family Law, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2012).
47 . HCJ 2232/03 Jane Doe v. Tel Aviv Rabbinical Court 61(3) PD 496 [2006] (Isr.).
48. See Triger, Freedom from Religion in Israel, supra note 5, at 1, 2, 6.
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the latter has been insisting on performing a full get (Jewish religious
divorce) procedure even for civilly married couples.49
V. CONCLUSION: ISRAELI SECULARISM—AN UNFULFILLED PROMISE
Israeli secularism is stumbling. The enclaves of religious laws within
Israeli law significantly limit Israelis’ freedom of conscience, freedom from
religion, the right to marry, and gender equality.
This Essay discussed two issues that demonstrate the problematic and
troubled relationship between state and religion in Israel: the question of
religious affiliation50 and the lack of civil marriage due to the religious
monopoly over marriage and divorce.51 Both issues are connected to the
notion that Israel is a Jewish state, both ideologically and demographically,
and that its Jewish definition and character are in the hands of the rabbinical
institutions, which are all Orthodox and male.52 Moreover, the complete
overlap between religion, ethnicity, and nationality leaves no space for civil
and secular definitions of “Jewish”; it renders the “democratic” in the Basic
Laws the only carrier of secularist values, and thus in constant competition
with the “Jewish” element.53
The rabbinical institution does not welcome attempts to inject secular
values into the definition of “Jewish.” The example discussed above of civil
marriage between two Jews performed abroad demonstrates the monolithic
approach to “Jewish” that the rabbinical court is trying to impose: Despite
the couple’s effort to avoid the rabbinical court, they must dissolve the
marriage, should they decide to divorce, by a full Jewish divorce ceremony
in the rabbinical court.54 This is because the rabbinical court has chosen to

49 . Id. at 7.
50. See supra Part III.
51. See supra Part IV.
52. See Gila Stopler, Contextualizing Multiculturalism: A Three Dimensional Examination of
Multicultural Claims, 1 LAW. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 309, 332–33 (2007); Triger, The Gendered
Racial Formation, supra note 32, at 519–20.
53. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty § 1a, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150, as amended
by SH No. 1454 p. 90 (Isr.), translation available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/
special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (“The purpose of this Basic Law is to protect
human dignity and liberty, in order to establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a
Jewish and democratic state.”).
54. See supra Part IV (describing the jurisdiction of rabbinical courts over divorce proceedings).
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disregard a Supreme Court ruling, which relied on halakhic principles as
interpreted by the secular court.55 The rabbinical court views itself as bound
by religious laws only, and its interpretation of the validity of civil marriage
between two Jews leads it to the conclusion that they too need a get.56
Secularism cannot exist without separation of state and church.57 The
monopoly awarded to religion in countries where there is no such separation
is bound to result in such legal enclaves in which the territorial law does not
apply. And in the Israeli case it weakens the “democratic” component of the
state’s definition as “a Jewish and democratic” state.58

55. See supra Part IV.
56. See supra notes 47–49 and accompanying text.
57. For a somewhat different conclusion in the Turkish context see Adrien Katherine Wing &
Ozan O. Varol, Is Secularism Possible in a Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example, 42
TEX. INT’L L.J. 1 (2006); Seval Yildirim, Aftermath of a Revolution: A Case Study of Turkish Family
Law, 17 PACE INT’L L. REV. 347, 365–68 (2005).
58. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 1a, supra note 53 (defining Israel as a
“Jewish and democratic state”).
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